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 Introduction 
When the International Court of Justice (ICJ or the Court) handed down its decision in the 
first maritime boundary delimitation case (the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases),1 it met 
with considerable criticism regarding the extent of subjectivity portrayed in the judgment.
2
 
The primary reason for this was the ICJ’s espousal and application of ‘equitable principles’ as 
the rule governing maritime boundary delimitation.
3
 Some scholars continued to attach this 
label to subsequent maritime delimitation decisions made on the basis of equitable 
principles.
4
 With successive cases moving away from the application of equitable principles 
in favour of the equidistance/relevant circumstances method or what the Court has, since the 
Black Sea case,
5
 christened its three-stage delimitation methodology, the label of subjectivity 
has largely been replaced with a new label, ‘objectivity’.6 This paper assesses the accuracy of 
this change of label by examining the decisions of the Court and Tribunals in some recent 
delimitation cases. This paper argues that although subjectivity may be said to have reduced, 
the delimitation of maritime boundaries by the Court and Tribunals still cannot be regarded as 
objective and predictable as exemplified in the decisions discussed in this paper. Each of the 
three stages in the three-stage methodology, namely the drawing of a provisional equidistance 
line, the adjustment or shifting of this line based on the presence of relevant circumstances 
and the (dis)proportionality test are analysed to support this position. This paper identifies a 
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fixation with following the three-stage methodology (even when inappropriate) as, ironically, 
the driver for subjectivity and unpredictability in maritime boundary delimitation decisions.  
 From Equitable Principles to Equidistance 
In 1969, the ICJ was asked to state what rules and principles the parties were to apply in 
delimiting their maritime boundaries in the North Sea. Whereas Denmark and the 
Netherlands contended that the applicable rule was equidistance as provided for in Article 6 
of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,7 Germany, which was not a party to that 
Convention, argued that the delimitation should leave to each party a just and equitable share 
of the continental shelf.8 Rejecting both arguments, the Court held that the fundamental rule 
governing entitlement ipso jure to the continental shelf was that the continental shelf was the 
natural prolongation of the land territory of the coastal State into and under the sea.9 This 
view was derived from the Truman Proclamation of 1945, which the Court regarded as the 
start of the positive law on the continental shelf.10 In keeping with this proclamation, the 
Court held that delimitation was to be effected on the basis of equitable principles, taking 
account of all relevant circumstances, so as to leave to a coastal State all those parts of the 
continental shelf that were a natural prolongation of its land territory.11 
This decision met with considerable criticism from both members of the bench and scholars. 
Judge Tanaka stated that the Court’s ‘equitable principles’ position does not and indeed 
cannot furnish any concrete criteria for delimitation. As the factors to be considered in order 
to give effect to the notion of equitable principles are diverse and incapable of objective 
evaluations, they are essentially useless in enabling States which seek to delimit their 
boundaries by agreement through negotiations reach a successful result.12 Similarly, Judge 
Sorenson opined that to introduce equity as the sole principle governing maritime 
delimitation is to create a situation of ‘considerable legal uncertainty’.13 Moreover, Judge 
Koretsky noted that reference to ‘equitable principles’ is vague and opens the door for 
subjective and arbitrary evaluations.14 In tandem with these opinions, legal scholars have 
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argued that the decision of the Court tended more to one made ex aequo et bono rather than 
one based on set legal principles.15 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, the applicability of equitable principles rather than 
equidistance was confirmed in the Gulf of Maine case,16 the Tunisia/Libya17 case and the 
Libya/Malta case.18 In the Gulf of Maine case, the Chamber noted that regarding equitable 
principles, ‘their equitableness or otherwise can only be assessed in relation to the 
circumstances of each case....’ and ‘that what international law requires is that recourse be 
had in each case to the criterion, or the balance of different criteria, appearing to be most 
appropriate to the concrete situation.’19 In the Tunisia/Libya case, the Court noted as a 
problem the fact that the word ‘equitable’ is used to characterise both the result and the 
means of achieving the result. Stating that the application of equitable principles must result 
in an equitable result, it opined that the result is predominant, whereas the principles are 
subordinate. Therefore a principle is equitable if it produces an equitable result.20 By this, the 
Court may be regarded as refuting the notion that certain principles are intrinsically equitable 
and therefore must be applied. The problem with this reasoning was the lack of objective 
criteria for determining what an equitable result is and by extension what constitutes 
equitable principles. In this regard, Jennings asks where the mental processes of the judges 
begin and whether the Court decides upon what it thinks is an equitable result first before 
proceeding to choose principles that it considers will give effect to the equitable result it has 
pre-decided.21 Jennings argues that the concept of ‘equitable result’ leads to ‘pure judicial 
discretion and a decision upon nothing more than the Court’s subjective appreciation of what 
appears to be a fair compromise of the claims of either side.’22 
In the Libya/Malta case, the Court stated the link between equitable principles and an 
equitable result when it noted that the former is important not just for a Court or Tribunal 
involved in adjudication but also the States, which during their negotiations to delimit their 
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boundaries by agreement, are doing nothing more than seeking an equitable result.23 The 
Court proceeded to set out expressly what equitable principles consist of:  
the principle that there is to be no question of refashioning geography, or 
compensating for the inequalities of nature; the related principle of non-
encroachment by one party on the natural prolongation of the other, which is no 
more than the negative expression of the positive rule that the coastal State enjoys 
sovereign rights over the continental shelf off its coasts to the full extent 
authorized by international law in the relevant circumstances; the principle of 
respect due to all such relevant circumstances; the principle that although all 
States are equal before the law and are entitled to equal treatment, “equity does 
not necessarily imply equality” ... nor does it seek to make equal what nature has 
made unequal; and the principle that there can be no question of distributive 
justice.24 
By setting out what equitable principles consist of, it may be argued that the Court was 
making an effort to reduce the subjectivity and uncertainty that a blanket application of 
equitable principles might entail. Nevertheless, Judge Oda, dissenting, criticised this decision 
as lacking substance, without the capacity to display the essential qualities of consistency and 
predictability required by law, and involving a ‘subjective appreciation of the 
circumstances.’25 Similarly, Judge Schwebel, in his dissenting opinion in the Jan Mayen case, 
decried the highly subjective nature of equitable principles, stating that what is equitable ‘is 
as variable as the weather of the Hague’.26  
The above cases were decided when the law of sea was governed by customary law and the 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.27 However, the entry into force of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)28 did not help matters as delegates at the 
Conference that produced the LOSC could not agree on a delimitation method. Consequently, 
LOSC Articles 74(1) and 83(1) simply require that delimitation ‘be effected by agreement on 
the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
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Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.’ In view of this, the Court has wide 
latitude to decide how it would reach the goal of ‘an equitable solution’. 
Sensitive to the criticism of lack of objectivity and predictability occasioned by the 
application of equitable principles for the delimitation of maritime boundaries, the Court 
developed what it now calls the three-stage delimitation methodology. Under this 
methodology, the Court begins by drawing a provisional equidistance line; it then checks 
whether there are any relevant circumstances which require the adjustment or shifting of the 
line in order to achieve an equitable solution. Last, it checks that the area accorded each State 
as a result of the first two steps is not disproportionate when compared with the length of its 
coasts.29 The Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration had noted that ‘the 
need to avoid subjective determinations requires that the method used starts with a measure 
of certainty that equidistance positively ensures, subject to its subsequent correction if 
justified’.30 Thus, beginning delimitation by drawing an equidistance line is promoted as a 
means of arriving at objective delimitation decisions. 
Although the three-stage methodology was confirmed in the Black Sea case, its development 
can be traced to the Jan Mayen case. In that case, the Court cited with approval the opinion of 
the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitration31 that the provision of Article 6 of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf requiring the use of the equidistance method to delimit 
boundaries except where special circumstances indicate otherwise, meant that where such 
special circumstances exist, the equidistance line should be varied or modified but not 
abandoned in favour of a different method of delimitation.32 Furthermore, the Court held that 
because the equidistance/special circumstances rule of Article 6 could be seen as expressing a 
general norm based on equitable principles, there was no appreciable difference between the 
result produced by the application of Article 6 and the result produced by the customary rule 
that delimitation be based on equitable principles.33  
This position was endorsed in the Qatar v. Bahrain34 case where the Court held that the 
equidistance/special circumstances method of Article 6 of the 1958 Convention and equitable 
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principles under customary law were ‘closely interrelated’.35 This move to introduce the 
equidistance method into the law on delimitation gained ground in the Cameroon v Nigeria36 
case where the Court pronounced it as ‘very similar’ to equitable principles and proceeded to 
state that the application of the customary rule requiring delimitations to be based on 
equitable principles consisted in first drawing an equidistance line, and then assessing 
whether or not  relevant circumstances existed that might inform the shifting or adjustment of 
the line.37 In essence, there was no difference between the equidistance method and equitable 
principles. So from rejecting equidistance in the early cases, the Court came to equate them 
with the equitable principles rule, and then declared boldly in the Black Sea case that it would 
always apply the three-stage methodology whenever it was required to effect a maritime 
boundary delimitation, unless compelling factors prevented it from so doing.38  
This transition from equitable principles to equidistance has been commended as embodying 
qualities of objectivity and predictability.39 This writer disagrees with this position and argues 
that the application of each of the three stages in the methodology has been shown to be 
fraught with subjectivity and, consequently, unpredictability. The next section examines each 
of these three stages to support this position. 
 The Three-Stage Methodology 
Provisional Equidistance Line 
At this first stage of the three-stage methodology, an equidistance line is drawn using 
methods that are geometrically objective.40 The line should ideally be constructed using all 
base points on the coasts in order to arrive at a strict equidistance line. However, selectivity in 
the choice of base points has introduced subjectivity into this otherwise objective first stage. 
Now the term ‘appropriate base points’41 is used in the cases to justify the base points chosen 
by the Court/Tribunal. Anderson notes that equidistance lines have always been drawn using 
the nearest points on the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, 
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not from the ‘most appropriate base points.’42 Likewise, in the Qatar v Bahrain case, the ICJ 
stated that ‘the equidistance line is the line every point of which is equidistant from the 
nearest point on the baseline from which the breath of the territorial seas of each of the two 
States is measured.’43 By endowing itself with the power to choose the most ‘appropriate base 
points’, there is ample scope for subjectivity.44 This gives cause for concern because the 
choice of base points inevitably affects the result from the construction of the equidistance 
line.45 
In the Black Sea case, the Court excluded Serpent’s Island as a source of base points in 
drawing the provisional equidistance line for the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf.
46
 The reason given by the Court was the fact that 
Serpent’s Island was detached from the coast of Ukraine lying some 20 nautical miles away 
from the mainland and so could not be regarded as part of Ukraine’s relevant coast as to do so 
would amount to grafting an extraneous component onto the coastline and therefore 
refashioning nature.47 However, this exclusion of Serpent’s Island was unusual as the 
provisional equidistance line ought to have been drawn with base points chosen on the island 
and only in the second stage ought the Court to have considered whether or not the island had 
a disproportionate effect on the line necessitating the shifting or adjustment of the line.48 
Briscoe and Prows note that the exclusion of Serpent’s Island in the choice of base points 
‘added complexity and uncertainty to the delimitation.’49 Similarly, Schofield states that 
ignoring Serpent’s Island in the choice of base points amounts to refashioning nature and 
undermines the ‘clarity and consistency of the three-stage process.’50 It would seem that the 
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Court ignored an objective geographical fact in order to arrive at a particular desired 
decision.51  
In keeping with these views, it is interesting to note that the ICJ had stated in this case that a 
consideration of relevant circumstances has no place at all in the first stage when the 
equidistance line is drawn as ‘the line is plotted on strictly geometrical criteria on the basis of 
objective data.’52 Yet when one considers that the effect of an island in a delimitation exercise 
is generally considered to be a relevant circumstance,53 suited for consideration not in the first 
but in the second stage, one observes that the Court effectively went against its stated 
position. 
Base points were also selectively chosen in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case54 and in the 
Bangladesh/Myanmar Arbitration.55 In the former, although certain Colombian islands 
generated entitlements to the east, base points were only chosen in respect of the western 
part, in spite of the Court’s pronouncement that the entire coastline of the islands had to be 
taken into account.56 To explain its decision, the Court stated that although a large part of the 
relevant coasts lay to the east of the Colombian islands, it would deal with this problem as a 
relevant circumstance in the second stage of the three-stage methodology.57 For the Court, 
this difficulty in placing base points on the east of the Colombian islands did not detract from 
the drawing of a provisional equidistance line. Judge Abraham thus criticised this exercise 
arguing that the line drawn could not properly be called an equidistance line and therefore 
failed the test as an acceptable starting point.58 Here again, one can observe a lack of 
objectivity and predictability even though the equidistance method is being used. 
In the latter case, the Tribunal ignored St Martin’s Island in the choice of base points for the 
construction of the provisional line for the delimitation of the EEZ and the continental shelf, 
simply citing the Black Sea case as precedent,59 leading Cottier to cite it as an example of 
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results not arrived at in a transparent manner.60 Similar criticisms levelled against the decision 
to ignore Serpent’s Island in the Black Sea are also applicable with regard to the treatment of 
St Martin’s Island in this case. 
Adjustment of the Equidistance line 
Adjustment of the equidistance line is the second stage in the ICJ’s three-stage methodology, 
and subjectivity is manifested here, even more so than in the first stage. This stage involves 
the consideration of whether relevant circumstances exist to justify the shifting or adjustment 
of the provisional equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable solution. This is a 
reminder of Jennings’ argument that what constitutes an equitable solution cannot be 
objectively articulated. Why is one solution considered equitable and another either not or 
more equitable than another?  
Considering that the Court/Tribunal has to, in this stage of delimitation, weigh the applicable 
relevant circumstances, one may ask how this weighing is done. Currently, there is no 
objective means for this and it explains why States argue over whether a particular 
circumstance should be regarded as relevant or not, and what weight should be accorded it. In 
this regard, Evans opines that ‘the exact means of assessing their impact and determining the 
necessary corrective is obscure.’61 Elsewhere, he states that the exercise of weighing relevant 
circumstances is ‘a remarkably vague one.’62 Similarly, Antunes notes that the steps for 
identifying factors, weighing up their relative relevance, and translating that assessment into a 
line remain largely undefined.’63 He further notes a paucity of demonstrations of how the 
factors chosen by the Court informed the final line decided as constituting an equitable 
solution.64 Although Antunes acknowledges that some measure of subjectivity is inevitable 
due to the nature of judicial decision-making, he argues that this is not the same as 
arbitrariness.65 However, as shown below, in recent cases, the adjustment of the provisional 
equidistance line has displayed such considerable subjectivity that the value of the three-stage 
method has been thrown into doubt.  
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In the Nicaragua v. Colombia case, Nicaragua argued against the application of the 
equidistance method, contending that its application could not lead to an equitable solution. 
This was due to the fact that the delimitation was between the mainland coast of Nicaragua 
and certain islands belonging to Colombia, rather than between two mainland coasts. 
Drawing a provisional equidistance line would deprive Nicaragua of a substantial part of the 
relevant area, since three-quarters of that area would be on the Colombian side.66 Moreover, 
adjusting or shifting the line could not lead to an equitable solution. Nicaragua therefore 
proposed the enclaving of the Colombian islands.67 The Court rejected this argument, holding 
that it was appropriate to remain faithful to its three-stage methodology and that although the 
problem involving diminution of a substantial part of the relevant area may constitute a 
relevant circumstance, this could only be addressed in the second stage of delimitation, where 
the Court adjusts the line to take account thereof. In order to shift the line, the Court decided 
on a weighting system where it gave a weighting of one to each Colombian base point and a 
weighting of three to each Nicaraguan base point. It thus constructed a line using a 3:1 ratio 
between the Nicaraguan and Colombian base points.68 
This decision was criticised extensively, particularly by fellow judges. Judge Keith noted that 
the Court could have simply considered the peculiar geographical realities involved in the 
case and chosen a combination of methods to enable it reach an equitable solution, rather than 
hiding under the cloak of equidistance and in the process having to make ‘major 
modifications in the application of the usual methodology.’69 Judge Xue also questioned 
whether adjustment or shifting of the provisional equidistance line is equivalent to a total 
departure from the line.70 Similarly, Judge Abraham decried the extensive subjectivity applied 
in reaching the delimitation decision. He noted that although the Court affirmed that it was 
following its three-stage methodology, ‘in reality, it diverges very considerably from it and 
actually it cannot do otherwise, since it is clear that the said method is inappropriate in the 
present case.’71 Furthermore, Judge Abraham observed that the considerable shifting of the 
provisional equidistance line eastwards, closer to the Colombian islands, and the construction 
of two horizontal lines in order to delimit the area east of the Colombian islands, cannot be 
regarded as shifting or adjustments as they were totally unrelated to the provisional 
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equidistance line.72 He concluded that the case is one in which the application of the three-
stage methodology was unsuitable and the Court could have acknowledged this rather than 
‘sacrifice clarity and intelligibility to the semblance of an illusory continuity.’73 This concern 
with ‘illusory continuity’ brings to the fore the fact that subjective decisions can be made in 
order to keep up appearances of following an objective method, namely, equidistance.  
Incidentally, the Court defended itself by stating that ‘[f]ollowing this approach 
[equidistance/relevant circumstances] does not preclude very substantial adjustment to, or 
shifting of, the provisional line in an appropriate case....’74 What did the Court mean by ‘very 
substantial adjustment’? Did it mean that it was entitled to draw a totally new line? Is the 
word ‘substantial’, qualified by the adjective ‘very’, compatible with the word ‘adjustment’, 
which in the context used in maritime boundary delimitation would mean ‘to alter or move 
(something) slightly’?75 Is it also compatible with the word, ‘shift’, which means to move 
something to a different position or direction, slightly76 or over a small distance?77 If then the 
Court thinks it is entitled to make ‘very substantial adjustments’ in order to arrive at an 
equitable solution, is it not safe to doubt the value of these adjustments insofar as it concerns 
objectivity and predictability? 
Indeed the problem of subjectivity in adjusting provisional equidistance lines was again 
evident in the Bangladesh/Myanmar Arbitration. In that case, the Tribunal rejected 
Bangladesh’s argument that the angle-bisector method be chosen for delimitation rather than 
adherence to the three-stage methodology. Insisting on following this methodology, the 
Tribunal drew a provisional equidistance line and proceeded to ‘adjust’ this line significantly 
in favour of Bangladesh by drawing a geodetic line starting at an azimuth of 215° without 
giving any concrete reason for so ‘adjusting’. Remarkably, Bangladesh had proposed the use 
of the angle-bisector method to draw the delimitation line starting at the same azimuth, 
prompting Judge Lucky, dissenting, to state: 
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I cannot agree with the view that the decision to use the 215° azimuth line to 
determine the direction of the adjustment to the provisional equidistance line is 
not based on the angle-bisector methodology either in principle or in the adoption 
of the particular azimuth calculated by Bangladesh.78 
The manner in which the Tribunal ‘adjusted’ the line starting at an azimuth of 215° led to the 
call by Judges Nelson, Chandrasekhara Rao and Cot in their Joint Declaration for faithfulness 
to the equidistance/relevant circumstances method and a caution  against super-imposing 
other methods of delimitation upon the equidistance/relevant circumstances method when 
implementing the latter. Failure to follow this caution, they stated, ‘would amount to 
reintroducing the very elements of subjectivity progressively reduced over the years.’79 
Although ‘subjectivity’ is a precise word for describing the Tribunal’s adjusted line, the 
adjustment may also be described as a mystery to the parties and to a general audience.80 
Indeed the way in which the Tribunal reached its conclusion that the azimuth of 215° 
represented an equitable solution lacks transparency, particularly as no reason was given for 
this conclusion.81 Judge Cot in his separate opinion described the Tribunal’s abandonment of 
the equidistance line for an azimuth line as ‘a perversion of the [equidistance/relevant 
circumstances] methodology’.82 Judge Ndiaye similarly noted that the Tribunal’s change of 
course from the equidistance/relevant circumstances method to the angle-bisector method, 
whilst maintaining that it was following the former amounted to a ‘contradiction and a logical 
paradox’.83 In the absence of any concrete reason for choosing the azimuth line, the azimuth 
line has been described as one that seems to have ‘come out of nowhere.’84 In view of this, it 
is logical to ask whether the word ‘adjustment’ means a license to substitute another line for 
the provisional equidistance line.85 Although this question should be answered in the 
negative, the reality is just as Judge Gao described: the whole adjustment exercise was 
excessive, unprecedented, manipulated and based on clearly subjective determinations.86 
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One observation from the foregoing analysis is that the door is open to subjectivity when a 
Court/Tribunal is so bent on adhering to the equidistance/relevant circumstances method in 
order to project the image of objectivity, even when the geographical realities inform a 
departure from it. It would seem from the discussion above, therefore, that choosing a method 
different from equidistance may have prevented resort to subjective considerations in the 
‘adjustment’ of the line. Judge Gao highlighted the fact that the inappropriateness of 
beginning with a provisional equidistance line made the subjective drawing of another line 
unavoidable.87 This was not different from the observation in the Nicaragua v. Colombia 
case, where the inappropriateness of employing the equidistance method led to a ‘very 
substantial’ adjustment of the equidistance line, provoking the comment that it may be 
necessary sometimes to depart from the standard method.88  
Another case where subjectivity was evident even though the three-stage methodology was 
supposedly being followed was the arbitration between Bangladesh and India.89 Here again, 
the Tribunal rejected the proposal by Bangladesh to use the angle-bisector method, choosing 
rather to apply the equidistance/relevant circumstances method. Similar to the Tribunal’s 
conclusion in the Bangladesh/Myanmar Arbitration, the Tribunal adjusted the provisional 
equidistance line to start at the azimuth of 177° 30′ 00″. This line, which the Tribunal did not 
explain how it was reached, bore close similarity with the azimuth of 180° line proposed by 
Bangladesh using the angle-bisector method.90 Dr Rao thus opined that the considerations for 
so adjusting the line were arbitrary and legally unjustifiable, concluding that ‘the majority 
subjectively shifted the provisional equidistance line to the 177° 30′ 00″ azimuth, the 
direction of which was not mandated by any observable criteria.’91 When the Tribunal 
mentioned that its adjustment was to ‘ameliorate the excessive negative impact’ of the 
provisional equidistance line on the entitlement of Bangladesh to the continental shelf beyond 
200 nautical miles and to achieve an equitable solution, without more, the Tribunal was 
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leaving observers at a loss as to the verifiable factors that informed the decision and against 
which the decision might be assessed.92 
Although some measure of subjectivity is inherent in the second stage of the three-stage 
methodology, because the Court is applying equity as a corrective function, it is submitted 
that this does not justify an adjustment that is so substantial as to be disturbing and 
unexplainable as exemplified in the cases analysed above. Scholars who praise the objectivity 
of the three-stage methodology hold that by beginning with equidistance and adjusting the 
equidistance line to make it equitable in the light of relevant circumstances, the quality of not 
only objectivity but also of flexibility required of the law is advanced.93 In this context, 
flexibility of the law to suit individual geographical circumstances becomes a justification for 
the adjustment of the line. This writer is of the view that this explanation does not help 
matters, for allusions to flexibility may be a sly way of introducing subjectivity. Thus one 
may ask how this differs from the earlier cases where each case was regarded as a unicum, to 
be adjudged based on its individual merits and not subject to any compulsory delimitation 
method? Again, what is the value of an objective first stage that is marred by so much 
subjectivity in the second stage that the gains of the objective first stage are lost after all? 
This is in tandem with the view expressed by Cottier that in assessing predictability as a 
result of utilising the equidistance method, it is necessary to go beyond assessing only the 
value of the strict equidistance line, and consider the entire norm (that is equidistance and 
relevant circumstances combined), including the potential for adjustments to the ‘objective’ 
equidistance line.94  
The Disproportionality Test 
The disproportionality test, the last of the three-stage methodology, has not been the basis for 
adjusting a delimitation line recently. However, the Court and Tribunals have acknowledged 
that this test of proportionality is not a precise or mathematical one; rather it is the Court’s 
broad assessment of whether a significant disproportion exists.95 The Tribunal in the 
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration stated that proportionality is used as a final check 
to ensure that the result of the application of the first two stages is equitable, not being tainted 
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with gross disproportion (that is gross disproportion between the length of the coast and the 
area attributed to the State following the drawing and adjusting of the equidistance line).96 
Following this line of thought, the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. Colombia case noted thus:  
The Court thus considers that its task, at this third stage, is not to attempt to 
achieve even an approximate correlation between the ratio of the lengths of the 
Parties’ relevant coasts and the ratio of their respective shares of the relevant area. 
It is, rather, to ensure that there is not a disproportion so gross as to “taint” the 
result and render it inequitable. Whether any disproportion is so great as to have 
that effect is not a question capable of being answered by reference to any 
mathematical formula but is a matter which can be answered only in the light of 
all the circumstances of the particular case.97 
This may be contrasted with the mathematical accuracy of a strict equidistance line. Tanaka 
argues that because there are no objective criteria for calculating coastal lengths, the 
proportionality test performed on the basis of this calculation may be regarded as subjective.98 
This position seems correct when one considers this dictum from the ICJ in the Black Sea 
case: 
The Court cannot but observe that various tribunals, and the Court itself, have 
drawn different conclusions over the years as to what disparity in coastal lengths 
would constitute a significant disproportionality which suggested the delimitation 
line was inequitable and still required adjustment. This remains in each case a 
matter for the Court’s appreciation, which it will exercise by reference to the 
overall geography of the area.99 
One is here faced with the fact that a decision on proportionality is based on the 
circumstances of each particular case; this is a reminder of the same criticism levelled against 
the equitable principles/relevant circumstances rule of delimitation that the law of maritime 
delimitation would reek of subjectivity and display a lack of predictability if each case is 
considered as a unicum. 
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In addition to the problem of calculating coastal lengths for determining the existence or 
otherwise of disproportionality, there is also the question of how any perceived disproportion 
is translated into an alteration of the line. There being no objective criteria for this, Evans 
describes the process as ‘completely unpredictable’. 100 For Higgins, ‘[t]he concept of 
proportionality in maritime delimitation remains, for me, full of uncertainties and 
problems.’101  
It is apparent that one ought not to look for objectivity and predictability at this third stage of 
the methodology. Notwithstanding the foregoing, as this stage involves an ex post facto test 
for confirming the equitableness of the line, and in view of its limited recent use in the 
adjustment of the proposed delimitation line, it would seem that the disproportionality test is 
nearly redundant and that the more important stages are stages one and two, as shown from 
the analysis above, and it is those stages that bring cause for concern.  
 Conclusion 
The equidistance/relevant circumstances rule, also known as the three-stage methodology, is 
now the general rule governing maritime boundary delimitation. Its use has been promoted as 
providing objectivity and predictability in the law of maritime boundary delimitation. This 
paper considered whether the three-stage delimitation methodology of the ICJ actually 
ensures that delimitation decisions are objective and predictable. The answer from the 
analysis is in the negative. From the choice of base points for drawing the provisional 
equidistance line to the adjustment of this line, the recent cases assessed in this paper have 
shown that considerable subjectivity and unpredictability exists within the application of the 
three-stage delimitation methodology. As Cottier notes ‘[i]t is one thing to define a 
methodology, but it is quite another to apply and realize it under the complex facts of a 
particular case.’102 A common thread running through the cases discussed (with the exception 
of the Black Sea case) reveals that subjectivity is driven, ironically, by an unwillingness to 
depart from the methodology which has been touted as adequate for ensuring objectivity and 
predictability in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. It is submitted that it is unnecessary 
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to proceed with the three-stage methodology simply for the sake of standardisation,103 if 
clarity and objectivity will be sacrificed thereby. 
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